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Consistency of a binary relation requires any preference cycle to involve indiﬀerence only.
As shown by Suzumura (1976b), consistency is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence
of an ordering extension of a relation. Because of this important role of consistency,
it is of interest to examine the rationalizability of choice functions by means of con-
sistent relations. We describe the logical relationships between the diﬀerent notions of
rationalizability obtained if reﬂexivity or completeness are added to consistency, both
for greatest-element rationalizability and for maximal-element rationalizability. All but
one notion of consistent rationalizability are characterized for general domains, and all of
them are characterized for domains that contain all two-element subsets of the universal
set. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation No.: D11.
Keywords: Rational Choice, Consistency, Binary Domains.1 Introduction
Samuelson (1938) began his seminal paper on revealed preference theory with a remark
that “[f]rom its very beginning the theory of consumer’s choice has marched steadily
towards greater generality, sloughing oﬀ at successive stages unnecessarily restrictive con-
ditions” (Samuelson, 1938, p. 61). Even after Samuelson (1938; 1947, Chapter V; 1948;
1950) laid the foundations of “the theory of consumer’s behaviour freed from any vestigal
traces of the utility concept” (Samuelson, 1938, p. 71), the exercise of Ockham’s razor
persisted within revealed preference theory. Capitalizing on Georgescu-Roegen’s (1954,
p. 125; 1966, p. 222) observation that the intuitive justiﬁcation of the axioms of revealed
preference theory has nothing to do with the special form of budget sets but, instead, is
based on the implicit consideration of choices from two-element sets, Arrow (1959) ex-
panded the analysis of rational choice and revealed preference beyond consumer choice
problems. He pointed out that “the demand-function point of view would be greatly
simpliﬁed if the range over which the choice functions are considered to be determined is
broadened to include all ﬁnite sets” (Arrow, 1959, p. 122). Sen (1971, p. 312) defended
Arrow’s domain assumption by posing two important questions: “why assume the axioms
[of revealed preference] to be true only for ‘budget sets’ and not for others?” and “[a]re
there reasons to expect that some of the rationality axioms will tend to be satisﬁed in
choices over ‘budget sets’ but not for other choices?”
While it is certainly desirable to liberate revealed preference theory from the narrow
conﬁnement of budget sets, the admission of all ﬁnite subsets of the universal sets into
the domain of a choice function may well be unsuitable for many applications. In this
context, two important groups of contributions stand out. In the ﬁrst place, Richter
(1966; 1971), Hansson (1968) and Suzumura (1976a; 1977; 1983, Chapter 2) developed
the theory of rational choice and revealed preference for choice functions with general
nonempty domains which do not impose any extraneous restrictions whatsoever on the
class of feasible sets. In the second place, Sen (1971) showed that Arrow’s results (as well
as others with similar features) do not hinge on the full power of the assumption that
all ﬁnite sets are included in the domain of a choice function—it suﬃces if the domain
contains all two-element and three-element sets.
It was in view of this current state of the art that Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura
(2001) examined two crucial types of domains in an analysis of several open questions
in the theory of rational choice. The ﬁrst is the general domain ` a la Richter, Hansson
and Suzumura, and the second is the class of base domains which include all singletons
1and all two-element subsets of the universal set. The status of the general domain seems
to be impeccable, as the theory developed on this domain is relevant in whatever choice
situations we may care to specify. The base domains also seem to be on safe ground, as
the concept of rational choice as maximizing choice is intrinsically connected with pairwise
comparisons: singletons can be viewed as pairs with identical components, whereas two-
element sets represent pairs of distinct alternatives. As Arrow (1951, p. 16; 1963) put
it, “one of the consequences of the assumptions of rational choice is that the choice
in any environment can be determined by a knowledge of the choices in two-element
environments.”
In this paper, we focus on the rationalizability of choice functions by means of consis-
tent relations. The concept of consistency was ﬁrst introduced by Suzumura (1976b), and
it is a weakening of transitivity requiring that any revealed preference cycle should involve
indiﬀerence only. As was shown by Suzumura (1976b; 1983, Chapter 1), consistency is
necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of an ordering extension of a binary relation.
For that reason, consistency is a central property for the analysis of rational choice as
well: in order to obtain a rationalizing relation that is an ordering, an extension proce-
dure is, in general, required in order to ensure that the rationalization is complete. We
examine consistent rationalizability under two domain assumptions. The ﬁrst is, again,
the general domain assumption where no restrictions whatsoever are imposed, and the
second weakens the base domain hypothesis: we merely require the domain to contain
all two-element sets but not necessarily all singletons, and we refer to those domains as
binary domains. Thus, our results are applicable in a wide range of choice problems. It
is worth pointing out that we do not require the triples to be part of our domain. In that
sense, our approach is more general than Sen’s.
Depending on the additional properties that can be imposed on rationalizations (re-
ﬂexivity and completeness), diﬀerent notions of consistent rationalizability can be deﬁned.
We characterize all but one of those notions in the general case, and all of them in the
case of binary domains. It is remarkable that we obtain full characterization results on
binary domains (in particular, on domains that do not have to contain any triples), even
though consistency imposes a restriction on possible cycles of any length.
In Section 2, the notation and our basic deﬁnitions are presented, along with some
preliminary lemmas. Section 3 develops the theory of consistent rationalizability on gen-
eral domains, whereas Section 4 expounds the corresponding theory on binary domains.
Some concluding remarks are collected in Section 5.
22 Preliminaries
The set of positive (nonnegative) integers is denoted by IN (IN0). For a set S, |S| is the
cardinality of S. Let X be a universal nonempty set of alternatives. X is the power
set of X excluding the empty set. A choice function is a mapping C:Σ →Xsuch
that C(S) ⊆ S for all S ∈ Σ, where Σ ⊆Xwith Σ 6= ∅ is the domain of C. Note
that C maps Σ into the set of all nonempty subsets of X. Thus, using Richter’s (1971)
terminology, the choice function C is assumed to be decisive. Let C(Σ) denote the image
of Σ under C, that is, C(Σ) = ∪S∈ΣC(S). In addition to arbitrary nonempty domains, to
be called general domains, we consider binary domains which are domains Σ ⊆Xsuch
that {S ∈X|| S| =2 }⊆Σ.
Let R ⊆ X×X be a (binary) relation on X. The asymmetric factor P(R)o fR is given
by (x,y) ∈ P(R) if and only if (x,y) ∈ R and (y,x) 6∈ R for all x,y ∈ X. The symmetric
factor I(R)o fR is deﬁned by (x,y) ∈ I(R) if and only if (x,y) ∈ R and (y,x) ∈ R for all
x,y ∈ X. The noncomparable factor N(R)o fR is given by (x,y) ∈ N(R) if and only if
(x,y) 6∈ R and (y,x) 6∈ R for all x,y ∈ X.
A relation R ⊆ X × X is (i) reﬂexive if, for all x ∈ X,( x,x) ∈ R; (ii) complete if, for
all x,y ∈ X such that x 6= y,( x,y) ∈ R or (y,x) ∈ R; (iii) transitive if, for all x,y,z ∈ X,
[(x,y) ∈ R and (y,z) ∈ R] implies (x,z) ∈ R; (iv) consistent if, for all K ∈ IN \{ 1} and
for all x0,...,x K ∈ X,( xk−1,x k) ∈ R for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} implies (xK,x 0) 6∈ P(R); (v)
P-acyclical if, for all K ∈ IN \{ 1} and for all x0,...,x K ∈ X,( xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R) for all
k ∈{ 1,...,K} implies (xK,x 0) 6∈ P(R).
The transitive closure of R ⊆ X × X is denoted by R, that is, for all x,y ∈ X,
(x,y) ∈ R if there exist K ∈ IN and x0,...,x K ∈ X such that x = x0,( xk−1,x k) ∈ R for
all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and xK = y. Clearly, R is transitive and, because we can set K =1 ,
it follows that R ⊆ R.
The direct revealed preference relation RC ⊆ X × X of a choice function C with an
arbitrary domain Σ is deﬁned as follows. For all x,y ∈ X,( x,y) ∈ RC if there exists
S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S. The (indirect) revealed preference relation of C is
the transitive closure RC of the direct revealed preference relation RC.
For S ∈ Σ and a relation R ⊆ X × X, the set of R-greatest elements in S is {x ∈ S |
(x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S}, and the set of R-maximal elements in S is {x ∈ S | (y,x) 6∈
P(R) for all y ∈ S}. A choice function C is greatest-element rationalizable if there exists
a relation R on X, to be called a G-rationalization, such that C(S) is equal to the set
of R-greatest elements in S for all S ∈ Σ. C is maximal-element rationalizable if there
3exists a relation R on X, to be called an M-rationalization, such that C(S) is equal to
the set of R-maximal elements in S for all S ∈ Σ. We use the term rationalization in
general discussions where it is not speciﬁed whether greatest-element rationalizability or
maximal-element rationalizability is considered.
Depending on the properties that we might want to impose on a rationalization, diﬀer-
ent notions of rationalizability can be deﬁned. For simplicity of presentation, we use the
following notation. G (respectively RG; CG; RCG) stands for greatest-element ratio-
nalizability by means of a consistent (respectively reﬂexive and consistent; complete and
consistent; reﬂexive, complete and consistent) G-rationalization. Analogously, M (respec-
tively RM; CM; RCM) is maximal-element rationalizability by means of a consistent
(respectively reﬂexive and consistent; complete and consistent; reﬂexive, complete and
consistent) M-rationalization. Note that we do not identify consistency explicitly in these
acronyms even though it is assumed to be satisﬁed by the rationalization in question.
This is because consistency is required in all of the theorems presented in this paper and
the use of another piece of notation would be redundant and likely increase the complex-
ity of our exposition. However, note that the two lemmas stated below do not require
consistency. In particular, part (i) of Lemma 2 ceases to be true if consistency is added
as a requirement; see also Theorem 1.
We conclude this section with two preliminary results. We ﬁrst present the follow-
ing lemma, the ﬁrst part of which is due to Samuelson (1938; 1948); see also Richter
(1971). It states that the direct revealed preference relation must be contained in any
G-rationalization and, moreover, that if an alternative x is directly revealed preferred to
an alternative y, then y cannot be strictly preferred to x by any M-rationalization.
Lemma 1 (i) If R is a G-rationalization of C, then RC ⊆ R.
(ii) If R is an M-rationalization of C, then RC ⊆ R ∪ N(R).
Proof. (i) Suppose that R is a G-rationalization of C and x,y ∈ X are such that
(x,y) ∈ RC. By deﬁnition of RC, there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S.
Because R is a G-rationalization of C, we obtain (x,y) ∈ R.
(ii) Suppose R is an M-rationalization of C and x,y ∈ X are such that (x,y) ∈ RC.
By way of contradiction, suppose (x,y) 6∈ R ∪ N(R). Therefore, (y,x) ∈ P(R). Because
R maximal-element rationalizes C, this implies x 6∈ C(S) for all S ∈ Σ such that y ∈ S.
But this contradicts the hypothesis (x,y) ∈ RC.
Our second preliminary observation concerns the relationship between maximal-element
rationalizability and greatest-element rationalizability when no further restrictions are im-
4posed on a rationalization. This applies, in particular, when consistency is not imposed.
Moreover, an axiom which is necessary for either form of rationalizability is presented.
This requirement is referred to as the V-axiom in Richter (1971); we call it direct-revelation
coherence in order to have a systematic terminology throughout this paper.
Direct-Revelation Coherence: For all S ∈ Σ, for all x ∈ S,i f( x,y) ∈ RC for all
y ∈ S, then x ∈ C(S).
Suzumura (1976a) establishes that, in the absence of any requirements on a rational-
ization, maximal-element rationalizability implies greatest-element rationalizability. Fur-
thermore, Richter (1971) shows that direct-revelation coherence is necessary for greatest-
element rationalizability by an arbitrary G-rationalization on an arbitrary domain. We
summarize these observations in the following lemma. For completeness, we provide a
proof.
Lemma 2 (i) If C is maximal-element rationalizable, then C is greatest-element ratio-
nalizable.
(ii) If C is greatest-element rationalizable, then C satisﬁes direct-revelation coherence.
Proof. (i) Suppose R is an M-rationalization of C. It is straightforward to verify that
R0 = {(x,y) | (y,x) 6∈ P(R)} is a G-rationalization of C.
(ii) Suppose R is a G-rationalization of C, and let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S be such that
(x,y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S. By part (i) of Lemma 1, (x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S. Because R is
a G-rationalization of C, this implies x ∈ C(S).
Richter (1971) shows that direct-revelation coherence is not only necessary but also
suﬃcient for greatest-element rationalizability on an arbitrary domain, without any fur-
ther restrictions imposed on the G-rationalization. Moreover, the axiom is necessary
and suﬃcient for greatest-element rationalizability by a reﬂexive (but otherwise unre-
stricted) rationalization on an arbitrary domain. The requirement remains, of course,
necessary for greatest-element rationalizability if we restrict attention to binary domains.
As shown below, if we add consistency as a requirement on a rationalization, direct-
revelation coherence by itself is suﬃcient for neither greatest-element rationalizability nor
for maximal-element rationalizability, even on binary domains.
53 General Domains
In this section, we impose no restrictions on the domain Σ. We begin our analysis by
providing a full description of the logical relationships between the diﬀerent notions of
rationalizability that can be deﬁned, given our consistency assumption imposed on a ra-
tionalization. The possible deﬁnitions of rationalizability that can be obtained depend on
whether reﬂexivity or completeness are added to consistency. Furthermore, a distinction
between greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability is made.
For convenience, a diagrammatic representation is employed: all axioms that are depicted
within the same box are equivalent, and an arrow pointing from one box b to another box
b0 indicates that the axioms in b imply those in b0, and the converse implication is not
true without further assumptions regarding the domain of C.
Theorem 1 Suppose Σ is a general domain. Then
RCG, CG, RCM, CM
↓↓
RG, G RM, M
Proof. We proceed as follows. In Step 1, we prove the equivalence of all axioms that
appear in the same box. In Step 2, we show that all implications depicted in the theo-
rem statement are valid. In Step 3, we provide examples demonstrating that no further
implications are true in general.
Step 1. For each of the three boxes, we show that all axioms listed in the box are
equivalent.
1.a. We ﬁrst prove the equivalence of the axioms in the top box.
Clearly, RCG implies CG and RCM implies CM. Moreover, if a relation R is reﬂexive
and complete, it follows that the set of R-greatest elements in S is equal to the set of
R-maximal elements in S for any S ∈ Σ. Therefore, RCG and RCM are equivalent.
To see that CM implies RCM, suppose R is a consistent and complete M-rationalization
of C. Let
R
0 = R ∪{ (x,x) | x ∈ X}.
Clearly, R0 is reﬂexive. R0 is consistent and complete because R is. That R0 is an M-
rationalization of C follows immediately from the observation that R is.
6To complete Step 1.a of the proof, it is suﬃcient to show that CG implies RCG.
Suppose R is a consistent and complete G-rationalization of C. Let
R
0 =( R ∪{ (x,x) | x ∈ X}∪{ (y,x) | x 6∈ C(Σ) and y ∈ C(Σ)})
\{ (x,y) | x 6∈ C(Σ) and y ∈ C(Σ)}.
Clearly, R0 is reﬂexive by deﬁnition.
To show that R0 is complete, let x,y ∈ X be such that x 6= y and (x,y) 6∈ R0.B y
deﬁnition of R0, this implies
(i) (x,y) 6∈ R and [x 6∈ C(Σ) or y ∈ C(Σ)]
or
(ii) x 6∈ C(Σ) and y ∈ C(Σ).
In case (i), the completeness of R implies (y,x) ∈ R and, by deﬁnition of R0, we obtain
(y,x) ∈ R0. In case (ii), (y,x) ∈ R0 follows immediately from the deﬁnition of R0.
Next, we show that R0 is consistent. Let K ∈ IN \{ 1} and x0,...,x K ∈ X be such
that (xk−1,x k) ∈ R0 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. Clearly, we can, without loss of generality,
assume that xk−1 6= xk for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. We distinguish two cases.
(i) x0 6∈ C(Σ). In this case, it follows that x1 6∈ C(Σ); otherwise we would have
(x1,x 0) ∈ P(R0) by deﬁnition of R0, contradicting our hypothesis. Successively apply-
ing this argument to all k ∈{ 1,...,K}, we obtain xk 6∈ C(Σ) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.B y
deﬁnition of R0, this implies (xk−1,x k) ∈ R for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By the consistency of
R, we must have (xK,x 0) 6∈ P(R). Because xK 6∈ C(Σ), this implies, according to the
deﬁnition of R0,( xK,x 0) 6∈ P(R0).
(ii) x0 ∈ C(Σ). If xK 6∈ C(Σ), (x0,x K) ∈ R0 follows immediately from the deﬁnition of R0.
If xK ∈ C(Σ), it follows that xK−1 ∈ C(Σ); otherwise we would have (xK,x K−1) ∈ P(R0)
by deﬁnition of R0, contradicting our hypothesis. Successively applying this argument to
all k ∈{ 1,...,K}, we obtain xk ∈ C(Σ) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By deﬁnition of R0,
this implies (xk−1,x k) ∈ R for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By the consistency of R, we must
have (xK,x 0) 6∈ P(R). Because x0 ∈ C(Σ), this implies, according to the deﬁnition of R0,
(xK,x 0) 6∈ P(R0).
Finally, we show that R0 is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose ﬁrst that
(x,y) ∈ R
0 for all y ∈ S. (1)
7We show that this implies (x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S which, in turn, implies x ∈ C(S)
because R is a G-rationalization of C. By way of contradiction, suppose there exists
y ∈ S such that
(x,y) 6∈ R. (2)
Then x 6∈ C(S) because R is a G-rationalization of C. The nonemptiness of C(S) implies
that there exists z ∈ S \{ x} such that z ∈ C(S) and, because C(S) ⊆ C(Σ), we obtain
z ∈ C(Σ). (3)
Because z ∈ S, we have
(x,z) ∈ R
0 (4)
by (1). If x = y, (2) implies (x,x) 6∈ R and, because R is a G-rationalization of C,
x 6∈ C(Σ). By (3) and the deﬁnition of R0, we obtain (z,x) ∈ P(R0), contradicting (4).
Similarly, if (x,z) 6∈ R, (3) and the deﬁnition of R0 together imply (x,z) 6∈ R0, again
contradicting (4). Therefore, we must have x 6= y and (x,z) ∈ R. Because R is a G-
rationalization of C, z ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S together imply (z,y) ∈ R. By the consistency
of R, we obtain (y,x) 6∈ P(R). Because x 6= y, the completeness of R implies (x,y) ∈ R,
contradicting (2).
To prove the converse implication, suppose x ∈ C(S). Because R is a G-rationalization
of C, we have (x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S. In particular, this implies (x,x) ∈ R and, according
to the deﬁnition of R0, we obtain (x,y) ∈ R0 for all y ∈ S.
1.b. The proof that RM and M are equivalent is analogous to the proof of the
equivalence of RCM and CM in Step 1.a.
1.c. Clearly, RG implies G. Conversely, suppose R is a consistent G-rationalization
of C. Let
R
0 =( R ∪{ (x,x) | x ∈ X}) \{ (x,y) | x 6∈ C(Σ) and x 6= y}.
Clearly, R0 is reﬂexive.
Next, we prove that R0 is consistent. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there
exist K ∈ IN \{1} and x0,...,x K ∈ X such that (xk−1,x k) ∈ R0 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and
(xK,x 0) ∈ P(R0). Again, we can assume that xk−1 6= xk for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. Because
of that, the deﬁnition of R0 implies that (xk−1,x k) ∈ R for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and
(xK,x 0) ∈ R. Because (xK,x 0) ∈ P(R0), it follows that (x0,x K) 6∈ R0.I f ( x0,x K) ∈ R,
the deﬁnition of R0 implies that x0 6∈ C(Σ). But then, by deﬁnition of R0, we have
(x0,x 1) 6∈ R0, a contradiction. Therefore, (x0,x K) 6∈ R and hence (xK,x 0) ∈ P(R),
contradicting the consistency of R.
8It remains to be shown that R0 is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
First, suppose (x,y) ∈ R0 for all y ∈ S.I f S = {x}, x ∈ C(S) follows from the
nonemptiness of C(S). If S 6= {x},
(x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S \{ x} (5)
by deﬁnition of R0. Furthermore, (x,y) ∈ R0 for all y ∈ S and the deﬁnition of R0
together imply x ∈ C(Σ). Therefore, because R is a G-rationalization of C, we must have
(x,x) ∈ R. Together with (5), it follows that (x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S and, because R is a
G-rationalization of C, x ∈ C(S).
Finally, suppose x ∈ C(S). This implies (x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S because R is a
G-rationalization of C. Furthermore, because C(S) ⊆ C(Σ), we have x ∈ C(Σ). By
deﬁnition of R0, this implies (x,y) ∈ R0 for all y ∈ S.
Step 2. The strict implications depicted by the arrows in the theorem statement are
straightforward.
Step 3. Given Steps 1 and 2, to prove that no further implications are valid, it is
suﬃcient to provide examples showing that (a) M does not imply G; and (b) G does not
imply M. Note that this independence of M and G in the presence of consistency does
not contradict part (i) of Lemma 2—consistency is not required in the lemma.
3.a. M does not imply G.
Example 1 Let X = {x,y,z} and Σ={{x,y},{x,z},{y,z}}. For future reference,
note that Σ is a binary domain. Deﬁne the choice function C by letting C({x,y})=
{x,y}, C({x,z})={x,z} and C({y,z})={y}. This choice function is maximal-element
rationalizable by the consistent (and reﬂexive) rationalization
R = {(x,x),(y,y),(y,z),(z,z)}.
Suppose C is greatest-element rationalizable by a consistent rationalization R0. Because
C(Σ) = X, greatest-element rationalizability implies that R0 is reﬂexive. Therefore, be-
cause y ∈ C({y,z}) and z 6∈ C({y,z}), we must have (y,z) ∈ R0 and (z,y) 6∈ R0.
Therefore, (y,z) ∈ P(R0). Because R0 is a G-rationalization of C, z ∈ C({x,z}) implies
(z,x) ∈ R0 and x ∈ C({x,y}) implies (x,y) ∈ R0. This yields a contradiction to the
assumption that R0 is consistent.
3.b. To prove that G does not imply M, we employ an example due to Suzumura
(1976a, pp. 151–152).
9Example 2 Let X = {x,y,z} and Σ={{x,y},{x,z},{x,y,z}}, and deﬁne C({x,y})=
{x,y}, C({x,z})={x,z} and C({x,y,z})={x}. This choice function is greatest-
element rationalizable by the consistent (and reﬂexive) rationalization
R = {(x,x),(x,y),(x,z),(y,x),(y,y),(z,x),(z,z)}.
Suppose R0 is an M-rationalization of C. Because z ∈ C({x,z}), maximal-element ra-
tionalizability implies (x,z) 6∈ P(R0) and, consequently, z 6∈ C({x,y,z}) implies (y,z) ∈
P(R0). Analogously, y ∈ C({x,y}) implies, together with maximal-element rationalizabil-
ity, (x,y) 6∈ P(R0) and, consequently, y 6∈ C({x,y,z}) implies (z,y) ∈ P(R0). But this
contradicts the above observation that we must have (y,z) ∈ P(R0). Note that consistency
(or any other property) of R0 is not invoked in the above argument. Moreover, R is re-
ﬂexive. Thus, RG does not even imply maximal-element rationalizability by an arbitrary
rationalization.
We now provide characterizations of two of the three notions of rationalizability iden-
tiﬁed in the above theorem. The ﬁrst is a straightforward consequence of Richter’s (1966)
result and the observation that consistency is equivalent to transitivity in the presence
of reﬂexivity and completeness. Richter (1966) shows that the congruence axiom is nec-
essary and suﬃcient for greatest-element rationalizability by a transitive, reﬂexive and
complete rationalization. Congruence is deﬁned as follows.
Congruence: For all x,y ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x,y) ∈ RC, y ∈ C(S) and x ∈ S, then
x ∈ C(S).
We obtain
Theorem 2 C satisﬁes RCG if and only if C satisﬁes congruence.
Proof. As is straightforward to verify, a relation is consistent, reﬂexive and complete if
and only if it is transitive, reﬂexive and complete. The result now follows immediately
from the equivalence of congruence and greatest-element rationalizability by a transitive,
reﬂexive and complete rationalization established by Richter (1966).
In order to characterize G (and, therefore, RG; see Theorem 1), we deﬁne the con-
sistent closure of the direct revealed preference relation RC. The consistent closure of
a relation is analogous to the transitive closure in the sense that the idea is to add all
pairs to the relation RC that must be in a G-rationalizing relation due to the requirement
10that the rationalization be consistent. In contrast to the transitive closure, however, this
addition of pairs to RC cannot be performed in a single step. After we add all pairs of
alternatives to RC that need to be added as a consequence of consistency, the resulting re-
lation may require further additions that are not imposed in the ﬁrst step. Consequently,
we proceed in a recursive fashion. We start with the direct revealed preference relation
RC, that is, we let R0
C = RC. Now suppose Rt





C ∪{ (x,y) | (x,y) ∈ Rt
C and (y,x) ∈ R
t
C}.
Because X is not necessarily ﬁnite, new pairs may be added at each step. However, even
if X is not countable, a countable number of steps turns out to suﬃce in order to capture















The following axiom is a strengthening of direct-revelation coherence which we call
consistent-closure coherence. It is obtained by replacing RC with R∗
C in the deﬁnition of
direct-revelation coherence.
Consistent-Closure Coherence: For all S ∈ Σ, for all x ∈ S,i f( x,y) ∈ R∗
C for all
y ∈ S, then x ∈ C(S).
Analogously to Lemma 1, we obtain
Lemma 3 (i) If R is a consistent G-rationalization of C, then R∗
C ⊆ R.
(ii) If R is a consistent M-rationalization of C, then R∗
C ⊆ R ∪ N(R).
Proof. (i) Suppose R is a consistent G-rationalization of C.
We ﬁrst prove by induction that Rt
C ⊆ R for all t ∈ IN 0. By Lemma 1, R0
C = RC ⊆ R.
Now suppose Rt
C ⊆ R for some t ∈ IN 0. Let (x,y) ∈ R
t+1
C . By deﬁnition, this implies
(x,y) ∈ Rt
C or [(x,y) ∈ Rt
C and (y,x) ∈ Rt
C]. If (x,y) ∈ Rt
C,( x,y) ∈ R follows from
the induction hypothesis. Now suppose the second possibility applies. Again using the
induction hypothesis, (y,x) ∈ Rt
C implies
(y,x) ∈ R. (7)
By deﬁnition of the transitive closure of a relation, (x,y) ∈ Rt
C implies that there exist
K ∈ IN and x0,...,x K ∈ X such that x = x0,( xk−1,x k) ∈ Rt
C for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and
11xK = y. By the induction hypothesis, (xk−1,x k) ∈ R for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.I f( x,y) 6∈ R,
(7) implies (y,x)=( xK,x 0) ∈ P(R). Because (x0,x 1) ∈ R, we must have K>1. But
this contradicts the consistency of R. Therefore, (x,y) ∈ R.
To complete the proof of part (i), suppose (x,y) ∈ R∗
C. By deﬁnition, there exists
t ∈ IN 0 such that (x,y) ∈ Rt
C which, by the previous observation, implies (x,y) ∈ R.
The proof of part (ii) is analogous, given Lemma 1.
We now obtain
Theorem 3 C satisﬁes G if and only if C satisﬁes consistent-closure coherence.
Proof. To prove the only-if part of the theorem, suppose R is a consistent G-rationalization
of C and let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S be such that (x,y) ∈ R∗
C for all y ∈ S. By Lemma 3,
(x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S. Thus, because R is a G-rationalization of C, x ∈ C(S). Note
that the consistency of R is not used in the above argument.
To establish the converse implication, we ﬁrst prove that R∗
C is consistent (note that
this is true by deﬁnition of R∗
C; consistent-closure coherence of C is not required). Suppose
K ∈ IN \{ 1} and x0,...,x K ∈ X are such that (xk−1,x k) ∈ R∗
C for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.I f
(xK,x 0) 6∈ R∗
C, we immediately obtain (xK,x 0) 6∈ P(R∗
C) and we are done. Now suppose
that (xK,x 0) ∈ R∗
C. By deﬁnition of R∗
C, it follows that, for all k ∈{ 0,...,K}, there
exists tk ∈ IN 0 such that (xk−1,x k) ∈ Rtk
C for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and (xK,x 0) ∈ Rt0
C.
Let t = max{tk | k ∈{ 0,...,K}}. By (6), (xk−1,x k) ∈ Rt
C for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}
and (xK,x 0) ∈ Rt
C. This implies (x0,x K) ∈ Rt




C implies (x0,x K) ∈ R
t+1
C . From (6), it follows that (x0,x K) ∈ R∗
C and
thus (xK,x 0) 6∈ P(R∗
C), which establishes the consistency of R∗
C.
Now suppose C satisﬁes consistent-closure coherence. We complete the proof by show-
ing that R∗
C is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S. Suppose (x,y) ∈ R∗
C for
all y ∈ S. Consistent-closure coherence implies x ∈ C(S). Conversely, suppose x ∈ C(S).
By deﬁnition, this implies (x,y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S and, because RC = R0
C ⊆ R∗
C,w e
obtain (x,y) ∈ R∗
C for all y ∈ S.
4 Binary Domains
In the case of binary domains, the presence of all two-element sets in Σ guarantees that
every G-rationalization must be complete and, as a consequence, all rationality require-
ments involving greatest-element rationalizability and consistency become equivalent. In
12contrast, maximal-element rationalizability by a consistent and complete rationalization
remains a stronger requirement than maximal-element rationalizability by a consistent
and reﬂexive rationalization. These observations are summarized in the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 4 Suppose Σ is a binary domain. Then
RCG, CG, RCM, CM, RG, G
↓
RM, M
Proof. We divide the proof into the same three steps as in Theorem 1.
Step 1. We prove the equivalence of the axioms for each of the two boxes.
1.a. Using Theorem 1, the equivalence of the axioms in the top box follows from the
observation that any consistent G-rationalization of C must be complete, given that Σ is
binary.
1.b. This part is already proven in Theorem 1.
Step 2. Again, the strict implication indicated by the arrow in the theorem statement
is straightforward.
Step 3. To prove that the reverse implication is not valid, Example 1 can be employed.
As shown in Theorem 4, there are only two diﬀerent versions of rationalizability for
binary domains. Consequently, we can restrict attention to the rationalizability axioms
G and M in this case, keeping in mind that, by Theorem 4, all other rationalizability
requirements involving consistent rationalizations are covered as well.
First, we show that G (and all other axioms that are equivalent to it according to The-
orem 4) is characterized by the following weak congruence axiom (see Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura, 2001).
Weak Congruence: For all x,y,z ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x,y) ∈ RC,( y,z) ∈ RC, x ∈ S
and z ∈ C(S), then x ∈ C(S).
In contrast to congruence, weak congruence does not apply to chains of direct revealed
preference of an arbitrary length but merely to chains involving three elements. For binary
domains, weak congruence is necessary and suﬃcient for all forms of greatest-element
13rationalizability involving a consistent G-rationalization. It is an interesting observation
that binary domains are suﬃcient to obtain results of that nature involving consistency,
even though those domains do not necessarily contain all triples. This is in contrast to
Sen’s (1971) results which crucially depend on having all triples available in the domain.
We obtain
Theorem 5 Suppose Σ is a binary domain. C satisﬁes G if and only if C satisﬁes weak
congruence.
Proof. By Theorem 4, G is equivalent to RCG given that Σ is a binary domain. More-
over, as mentioned earlier, consistency is equivalent to transitivity in the presence of
reﬂexivity and completeness. Theorem 3 in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2001)
states that greatest-element rationalizability by a reﬂexive, complete and transitive rela-
tion is equivalent to weak congruence, provided that Σ is a binary domain. The result
follows immediately as a consequence of this observation.
Finally, we establish that direct-revelation coherence and P-acyclicity of RC together
are necessary and suﬃcient for M (and RM) on a binary domain. This result is analogous
to the characterization of greatest-element rationalizability by a P-acyclical, reﬂexive and
complete rationalization on base domains (domains that contain all singletons in addition
to all two-element sets) in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2001, Theorem 5).
Theorem 6 Suppose Σ is a binary domain. C satisﬁes M if and only if C satisﬁes
direct-revelation coherence and RC is P-acyclical.
Proof.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that M implies that RC is P-acyclical (that direct-revelation
coherence is implied follows from Lemma 2). Suppose R is a consistent M-rationalization
of C. By way of contradiction, suppose RC is not P-acyclical. Then there exist K ∈
IN \{ 1} and x0,...,x K ∈ X such that (xk−1,x k) ∈ P(RC) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and
(xK,x 0) ∈ P(RC). Because Σ is a binary domain, {xk−1,x k}∈Σ for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}
and {x0,x K}∈Σ. By deﬁnition of RC, it follows that xk 6∈ C({xk−1,x k}) for all k ∈
{1,...,K} and x0 6∈ C({x0,x K}). Because R is an M-rationalization of C, it follows
that (xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and (xK,x 0) ∈ P(R), contradicting the
consistency of R.
Step 2. We show that direct-revelation coherence and the P-acyclicity of RC together
imply M. Deﬁne
R = RC \{ (x,y) | (x,y) ∈ I(RC)}.
14By deﬁnition, P(R)=R = P(RC) and, consequently, R is consistent because RC is
P-acyclical.
It remains to be shown that R is an M-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose ﬁrst that x is R-maximal in S, that is, (y,x) 6∈ P(R) for all y ∈ S.I fS = {x},
x ∈ C(S) follows from the nonemptiness of C(S). Now suppose S 6= {x}, and let
y ∈ S \{ x}. Because Σ is a binary domain, {x,y}∈Σ. If x ∈ C({x,y}), we obtain
(x,y) ∈ RC by deﬁnition. If x 6∈ C({x,y}), it follows that (y,x) ∈ RC and, because
(y,x) 6∈ P(R)=P(RC) by assumption, we again obtain (x,y) ∈ RC. By direct-revelation
coherence, it follows that x ∈ C(S).
Now suppose x ∈ C(S). This implies (x,y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S and, therefore,
(y,x) 6∈ P(RC)=P(R) for all y ∈ S. Therefore, x is R-maximal in S.
5 Concluding Remarks
The only notion of consistent rationalizability that is not characterized in this paper is
maximal-element rationalizability by means of a consistent (and reﬂexive) rationalization
on a general domain. The reason why it is diﬃcult to obtain necessary and suﬃcient
conditions in that case is the existential nature of the requirements for maximal-element
rationalizability. It is immediately apparent that the revealed preference relation must
be respected by any greatest-element rationalization, whereas this is not the case for
maximal-element rationalizability (see Lemma 2). In order to exclude an element from
a set of chosen alternatives according to maximal-element rationalizability, it merely is
required that there exists (at least) one element in that set which is strictly preferred to
the alternative to be excluded. The problem of identifying necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for that kind of rationalizability is closely related to the problem of determining the
dimension of a quasi-ordering; see, for example, Dushnik and Miller (1941). Because this
is an area that is still quite unsettled, it is not too surprising that characterizations of
maximal-element rationalizability on general domains are diﬃcult to obtain. To the best of
our knowledge, this is a feature that is shared by all notions of maximal-element rational-
izability that are not equivalent to one of the notions of greatest-element rationalizability
on general domains: we are not aware of any characterization results for maximal-element
rationalizability on general domains unless the notion of maximal-element rationalizability
employed happens to coincide with one of the notions of greatest-element rationalizability.
Thus, there are important open questions to be addressed in future work in this area of
research.
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